Page 115 of Cry Havoc
Penkovsky closed the folder and set it down.
“The Americans will continue to operate on the assumption that without the codes the decryption machines are useless because those codes are changed frequently. They still consider their encrypted messages unbreakable even though we have the machines. Dr. Egorov has confirmed that the keying material provided by John Walker, and those provided by Allister Desmond, are a match.”
“So, this was not a disinformation operation.”
“It appears not.”
“Then why did the ship have so much unnecessary classified material?”
“That is unknown.”
“I remain skeptical. It’s as if they wanted us to acquire it.”
“We may give them too much credit, Director. It could all come down to ineptitude. They have made mistakes before: ignoring all the signs that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor; the Korean War; our intention to install nuclear missiles in Cuba; and their own intelligence reports before Tet indicating an attack was imminent.”
“True. Why did the DPRK take her?”
“We don’t know for certain. It’s possible they thought she was South Korean or in North Koran waters. We are still investigating. It could be that Kim Il-Sung could not resist the opportunity to humiliate the United States. Just prior to thePuebloincident, they launched a commando raid into the South. Their mission was to kill Park Chung Hee, the South Korean president, in his presidential mansion called the Blue House.”
“I read the report. Thirty commandos from the 124th Army Unit. They were to cut off Park’s head and kill his family, staff, and the American ambassador and his wife.”
“That is correct, sir. They had originally targeted the South Korean military headquarters and a penitentiary to free communist prisoners. All thirty commandos were eventually hunted down and killed save for their leader who was captured. It is possible that the DPRK thought thePueblowas part of a retaliation for the commando raid. Regardless, through interrogations we know that Commander Bucher was unaware of the events in South Korea.”
“I find it hard to believe the American Navy did not relay that information to Bucher and his crew.”
“This incident, along with Tet, speaks to the limits of American power.”
“Might the Americans bomb a base in North Korea, perhaps a harbor or airfield, in retaliation?”
“Doubtful. That risks opening another front in Asia while they are already bogged down in Vietnam.”
“Rescue attempts?”
“No doubt there are those proposing that very thing. Johnson will veto it.”
“I’ve read their newspapers. The American public wants action.”
“Yes, but none will come. Any military action virtually guarantees the crew of thePueblowill be executed. Even though they are massing forces in South Korea, the American public will soon be distracted by the dead in Vietnam, not the living in North Korea.”
“Secretary of State Dean Rusk called it an act of war.”
“They have given the South Koreans another hundred million in military aid. That will be the extent of their response for now.”
“How certain are you?”
“As certain as I can be. I have spent most of the past twenty years studying our American adversary.”
“But these remain guesses.”
“Yes.”
“The United States has twice asked us for help in negotiating therelease of their sailors through diplomatic channels. Both times we have rejected them. Helping secure their release would make us look weak to the DPRK and Chinese.”
“That is true.”
“Some in the U.S. government undoubtedly suspect us.”
“We are merely the fortunate beneficiaries of this incident,” Penkovsky said.
