“I can’t believe the Americans did not scuttle their ship or destroy these machines,” Egorov said, changing the direction of the conversation and again tapping the file in his hands.
“They tried, but upon inspection it appears that the ship had very little in the way of destructive devices. Most everything was still intact. As to why they did not scuttle their ship, perhaps the Americans are not the adversaries we thought?” Lavrinenko offered.
“And the sailors?”
“They will stay in the DPRK.”
“For how long?”
“Let the politicians deal with that. We will get the interrogation reports and be able to tailor the questioning to meet our needs. Any queries you need answered by the captured American crypto technicians can be passed to our Sixth Directorate men in North Korea. Our goal is to decrypt American NSA communications without their knowledge. Any information you need from the prisoners should pass through Deputy Director Penkovsky,” Lavrinenko said, pointing his caviar-heavy spoon at his second in command.
“How long will we have access to the Americans?” Egorov asked.
“Work as if you had weeks, but in all likelihood, you will have months. Our Sixth Directorate men in the DPRK are facilitating a transfer of the equipment as we speak. I will have it sent to you in Berlin.”
“I will still need encryption keys.”
“Excuse me?”
“Encryption keys. To decrypt communications, we will need the latest keying material.”
“Concern yourself with getting the American machines running; learn everything about them. Reverse engineer them so we can build exact copies. Leave the keying material to me.”
“Yes, sir.”
“And leave the file. I will have a copy made available to you. Send daily reports to Deputy Director Penkovsky. You are dismissed.”
Egorov stood, carefully set the file on Lavrinenko’s desk, and made his way to the door on unsteady legs.
When it shut behind him, Lavrinenko helped himself to another heaping spoonful of caviar before turning to his deputy.
“What do you think?”
Penkovsky folded his hands in his lap.
“It is possible the Americans intended for us to acquire their cipher machines,” he said, his voice slow and calm, almost detached.
“I have considered that. But to give up their crew? That seems unlikely.We will soon know more from interrogations. How could they not have destroyed all the sensitive material? From the reports it would seem they had the time,” Lavrinenko observed.
“Let us not underestimate their propensity to deceive,” Penkovsky replied.
“Let us not give them too much credit either.”
“Perhaps they have a new encryption device that is unknown to us, and they plan to feed us disinformation through the KW-7 and KL-47?” Penkovsky offered.
“If that is the case, they would have had to identify our spies in their intelligence services and military and be working them back as doubles. And they would have to be sure they hadallour spies. If not, there is too high a likelihood that we would find out from an asset in their midst.”
“True.”
“Everything points toPueblo’s capture being a complete surprise to the Americans.”
“Had the Koreans consulted us, I have to think we would have advised against taking it,” Penkovsky said.
“I believe so. It is an act of war, and we have a mutual defense agreement in place with the Koreans. As it is, the Americans practically gave it to them, but, now that we have it almost wholly intact and have access to the surviving crew, this may turn out to be one of the greatest intelligence coups of the decade,” Lavrinenko said, resting his hands on his protruding midsection.
“Egorov will learn those machines front to back. This triumph may be on par with the Poles cracking Enigma prior to the Great Patriotic War,” said Penkovsky.
“If he does, and if the keying material from our spies in the West allows us to decrypt NSA communications, we then have a new problem.”